Hybridity, So What?
The Anti-hybridity Backlash and the Riddles of Recognition

Jan Nederveen Pieterse

OPENING UP to identity politics and politics of difference is one of the changes of recent times, and recognition further widens this frame. As the goalposts are shifted towards recognition and difference new problems arise. As identity politics comes to the fore, does interest politics fade into the background? What is the relationship between identity and class, between recognition and social justice? What about recognition of the steepest difference of all, which is the world’s development gap? These questions are explored elsewhere in this volume. This inquiry probes a different set of questions. If we recognize ‘others’, according to which boundaries do we identify ‘others’? If we recognize difference, what about ‘difference within’? What about those who straddle or are in between categories and combine identities?

To what extent is recognition a function of the available categories of knowledge and cognitive frames in which self and others are identifiable and recognizable? Can it be that recognition is an exercise in reproduction, recycling the categories in which existing social relations have been coded while stretching their meaning? Recognition, then, stretches or revalues social boundaries but does not transgress them. To what extent is the politics of recognition a politics of musical chairs – as one more identity is acknowledged, another is left behind? As the spotlight turns to one identity, does another fade into the shadow? To what extent does the politics of recognition chase the social horizon which ever recedes as one comes closer? To what extent is ‘progress’ (such a difficult word) measured not simply in attainment (because any attainment is partial and entails a price) but in process and motion? And then what would such acknowledgement of process entail?

[0263-2764(200104/06)18:2–3;1–000;0xxxxx]
‘Recognition’ refers to the willingness to socially or publicly validate or affirm differences as they are perceived, but what about differences that are not being perceived? Recognition and difference are a function of the existing identities and boundaries that are available on the social and cultural maps. Recognition is part of a process of struggle over cognition. Hybridity is a journey into the riddles of recognition. Take any exercise in social mapping and it is the hybrids that are missing. Take most models and arrangements of multiculturalism and it is hybrids that are not counted, not accommodated. So what? This article addresses this question. The 2000 Census in the United States is the first that permits multiple identification: for the first time one can identify as Caucasian, African American, Hispanic, etc., and as all of those. This public recognition of multiple identity has been controversial particularly for minorities whose entitlements depend on recognition of their numbers.

The first section of this article discusses the varieties of hybridity and the widening range of phenomena to which the term now applies. According to anti-hybridity arguments hybridity is inauthentic and is a kind of ‘multiculturalism lite’. Examining the current anti-hybridity backlash provides an opportunity to deepen and fine-tune our perspective on hybridity. Part of what is missing in these arguments is historical depth; the third section in this article deals with the longue durée and proposes multiple historical layers of hybridity. The fourth section concerns the politics of boundaries, for in the end the real problem is not hybridity – which is common throughout history – but boundaries and the social proclivity to boundary fetishism. Hybridity is unremarkable and is noteworthy only from the point of view of boundaries that have been essentialized. What hybridity means varies not only over time but also in different cultures, and this informs different patterns of hybridity. Then we come back to the original question: so what? The importance of hybridity is that it problematizes boundaries.

Varieties of Hybridity

Fairly recent on the horizon, after Latino rock, is Mandarin pop, a Cantonese and Pacific American combination of styles. One of its original inspirations is Hong Kong crooners doing Mandarin cover versions of Japanese popular ballads. The Japanese ballads were already a mixture of Japanese and American styles that featured, for instance, saxophone backgrounds. Mandarin pop (or Mandopop) is part of the soundscape of the Pacific Chinese diaspora. Its audience ranges from youngsters in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan to prosperous second-generation Chinese immigrants in the United States (Tam, 2000).

Many have these kind of cultural phenomena in mind when they think of hybridity. We could call it the world music model of hybridity. Its general features are that it concerns cultural expressions, which are new and recent, a recombination of existing combinations, and they involve a limited range in expression and a distinctive audience, particularly an urban, newly
prosperous audience. And while they are significant because they reflect and cater to a new class or stratum, their meaning is clearly restricted.

New hybrid forms are significant indicators of profound changes that are taking place as a consequence of mobility, migration and multiculturalism. However, hybridity thinking also concerns existing or, so to speak, old hybridity, and thus involves different ways of looking at historical and existing cultural and institutional arrangements. This is a more radical and penetrating angle that suggests not only that things are no longer the way they used to be, but were never really the way they used to be, or used to be viewed.

For some time hybridity has been a prominent theme in cultural studies. It follows older themes of syncretism in anthropology and creolization in linguistics. In cultural studies hybridity denotes a wide register of multiple identity, cross-over, pick-'n'-mix, boundary-crossing experiences and styles, matching a world of growing migration and diaspora lives, intensive intercultural communication, everyday multiculturalism and erosion of boundaries. In optimistic takes on hybridity, ‘hybrids were conceived as lubricants in the clashes of culture; they were the negotiators who would secure a future free of xenophobia’ (Papastergiadis, 1997: 261). This angle, which is both instrumental and celebratory, may overlook that hybridity is also significant in its own right, as the experience of hybrids. An Afro-German writes:

I always liked being a ‘mulatto’, even in the terrible times of National Socialism. I have been able to manage the black and white in me very well. I remember when a colleague once asked me during the terrible 1940s whether I was very unhappy having to live as mulatto. I said, ‘No, you know, what I have experienced in my life because of my ethnic origin, you will never in your entire life experience.’ (quoted in Beck, 1998: 125)

Hybridity thinking has been criticized for being a ‘dependent’ thinking that makes sense only on the assumption of purity (Young, 1995). In addition, of late there has been a polemical backlash against hybridity thinking. Hybridity, it is argued, is inauthentic, without roots, for the elite only, does not reflect social realities on the ground. It is multiculturalism lite, highlights superficial confetti culture and glosses over deep cleavages that exist on the ground. The downside of this anti-hybridity backlash is that it recycles the 19th-century parochialism of an ethnically and culturally compartmentalized world, whose present revival and re-articulation is baffling. In my understanding, hybridity is deeply rooted in history and quite ordinary. Indeed, what is problematic is not hybridity but the fetishism of boundaries that has marked so much of history. That history should not be seen this way and hybridity somehow viewed as extraordinary or unusual is baffling. Besides I’m hybrid myself. However, engaging the anti-hybridity backlash offers an opportunity to enter more deeply into and thus develop the hybridity perspective.
The first point to consider is the varieties of hybridity, as phenomena and as perspective (a schema is in Table 1).

Hybridization as a process is as old as history, but the pace of mixing accelerates and its scope widens in the wake of major structural changes, such as new technologies that enable new phases of intercultural contact. Contemporary accelerated globalization is such a new phase. A major terrain of newly emerging mixtures are the new middle classes and their cultural and social practices arising in the context of migration and diaspora and the new modernities of the ‘emerging markets’. For almost two decades the growth rates of the Asian Tiger economies and other emerging markets have been twice as high as those of Western countries. This entails vast applications of new technologies and the emergence of new social mores and consumption patterns. They are typically fusion cultures that combine new technologies and existing social practices and cultural values (cf. Robison and Goodman, 1996; Nederveen Pieterse, 1998a).

Nilufer Göle discusses changes in Islam in Turkey in terms of ‘hybridization between Islamists and modernity’ (2000: 112).

As can be observed in the Turkish context, not only are Islamists using the latest model of Macintosh computers, writing best-selling books, becoming part of the political and cultural elite, winning elections, and establishing private universities, but they are also carving out new public spaces, affirming new public visibilities, and inventing new Muslim lifestyles and subjectivities. . . . An Islamic service sector offers luxury hotels that advertise facilities for an Islamic way of vacationing; they feature separate beaches and nonalcoholic beverages. Islamic dress and fashion shows, Islamic civil society associations, Islamic pious foundations, associations of Islamic entrepreneurs, and Islamic women’s platforms all attest to a vibrant and rigorous social presence. (Göle, 2000: 94)

If practices of mixing are as old as the hills, the thematization of mixing as a discourse and perspective is fairly new. In one sense it dates from the
1980s. In a wider sense it concerns the general theme of *bricolage* and improvisation. Its lineages include psychoanalysis and its bringing together of widely diverse phenomena – such as dreams, jokes, Freudian slips and symbols – under new headings relevant to psychological diagnosis. Psychoanalysis synthesized sensibilities ranging from Nietzsche to 19th-century novels and art. Dada made mixing objects and perspectives its hallmark, which inspired the technique of collage. Marcel Duchamp hybridized art itself. Surrealism moved further along these lines and so did conceptual and installation art.

The domains in which hybridity plays a part have proliferated over time:

- The term hybridity originates in pastoralism, agriculture and horticulture. Hybridization refers to developing new combinations by grafting one plant or fruit to another.
- A further application is genetics. When belief in ‘race’ played a dominant part, miscegenation and ‘race mixture’ were prominent notions.
- Previously hybridity referred to combinations of different animals, such as the griffin, or animals and humans, such as the centaur and satyr; now it also refers to cyborgs (cybernetic organisms), combinations of humans or animals and technology (pets carrying chips for identification, biogenetic engineering).
- Hybridity first entered social science via the anthropology of religion, through the theme of syncretism. Roger Bastide defined syncretism as ‘uniting pieces of the mythical history of two different traditions in one that continued to be ordered by a single system’ (1970: 101).
- Creole languages and creolization in linguistics was the next field to engage social science interest. Bakhtin’s work on polyphony is a related strand. In time, creolization became a wider metaphor (e.g. Richards, 1996; Siebers, 1996).
- Presently, the main thrust of hybridity thinking concerns cultural hybridity, including art (e.g. Harvey, 1996).
- Other strands concern structural and institutional hybridization, including governance (Ruijter, 1996).
- Organizational hybridity (Oliver and Montgomery, 2000) and diverse cultural influences in management techniques are other common themes (e.g. Beale, 1999).
- Interdisciplinarity in science has given rise to ‘new hybrids’ such as ecological economics (McNeill, 1999: 322).
- ‘Menus have increasingly become monuments to cultural hybridity’ (WARDE, 2000: 303).
- Most common of all is everyday hybridity in identities, consumer behaviour, lifestyle, etc.

International relations, education, the ‘hybrid car’ (combining petrol and electricity) and so forth; nowadays there’s no end to the travel and spread of hybridity. The current polemic on hybridity, however, only considers cultural
hybridity, which captures but a small slice of the domains indicated above. The world music model of hybridity is narrower still and only concerns recent cultural blends. Besides short-changing the varieties of hybridity, other fundamental considerations are oddly missing in the current anti-hybridity backlash. One concerns the historical depth of hybridity viewed in the longue durée. The second is the circumstance that boundaries and borders can be matters of life or death and the failure to acknowledge hybridity is a political point whose ramifications can be measured in lives.

In the end the anti-hybridity backlash is a minor debate. The issue is not whether to be for or against hybridity; the debate concerns another question: hybridity so what? What is the significance of hybridity? To take this further means to unpack hybridity in its varieties and to distinguish patterns of hybridity. Meanwhile the other side of this question is: boundaries so what?

The Anti-hybridity Backlash
Criticisms of particular versions of hybridity arguments and quirks in hybridity thinking are familiar. The most conspicuous shortcoming is that hybridity skips over questions of power and inequality: ‘hybridity is not parity’. Some arguments make no distinction between different levels: ‘The triumph of the hybrid is in fact a triumph of neo-liberal multiculturalism, a part of the triumph of global capitalism’ (Araeen, 2000: 15). These wholesale repudiations of hybridity thinking belong in a different category: this is the anti-hybridity backlash, which this article takes on. In the discussion below most arguments against hybridity thinking have been taken from Friedman (1997, 1999) as representative of a wider view. A précis of anti-hybridity arguments and rejoinders is in Table 2.

‘Hybridity is Meaningful only as a Critique of Essentialism’
There is plenty essentialism to go round. Boundary fetishism has long been, and in many circles continues to be, the norm. After the nation, one of the latest forms of boundary fetishism is ‘ethnicity’. Another reification is the ‘local’. Friedman cites the statement above (Nederveen Pieterse, 1995: 63) and then concludes that ‘hybridization is a political and normative discourse’ (1999: 242). Indeed, but so of course is essentialism and boundary fetishism. ‘In a world of multiplying diasporas, one of the things that is not happening is that boundaries are disappearing’ (1999: 241). That, on the other hand, is much too sweeping a statement to be meaningful. On the whole, cross-boundary and cross-border activities have been on the increase, as a wide body of work in international relations and international political economy testifies, where the erosion of boundaries is one of the most common accounts of contemporary times and globalization.

Were Colonial Times Really so Essentialist?
This is a question raised by Young (1995). Here we can distinguish multiple levels: actual social relations, in which there was plenty of border-crossing,
Table 2  Arguments for and against Hybridity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Contra hybridity</strong></th>
<th><strong>Pro hybridity</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hybridity is meaningful only as a critique of essentialism.</td>
<td>There is plenty essentialism around.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were colonial times really so essentialist?</td>
<td>Enough for hybrids to be despised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybridity is a dependent notion.</td>
<td>So are boundaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asserting that all cultures and languages are mixed is trivial.</td>
<td>Claims of purity have long been dominant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybridity matters to the extent that it is a self-identification.</td>
<td>Hybrid self-identification is hindered by classification boundaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybridity talk is a function of the decline of Western hegemony.</td>
<td>It also destabilizes other hegemonies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybridity talk is carried by a new cultural class of cosmopolitans.</td>
<td>Would this qualify an old cultural class of boundary police?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘the lumpenproletariat real border-crossers live in constant fear of the border’</td>
<td>Crossborder knowledge is survival knowledge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Hybridity is not parity’</td>
<td>Boundaries don’t usually help either.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and discourse, which is differentiated between mainstream and marginal discourses. Discourse and representation were also complex and multi-layered, witness for instance the mélange of motifs in Orientalism (e.g. Mackenzie, 1995; Clarke, 1997). While history, then, is a history of ambivalence, attraction and repulsion, double takes and zigzag moves, nevertheless the 19th and early 20th-century colonial world was steeped in a Eurocentric pathos of difference, dédain, distinction. All the numerous countermoves in the interstices of history do not annul the overall pathos of the White Man’s Burden and the mission civilisatrice, nor its consequences.

But the imperial frontiers are not only geographical frontiers, where the ‘civilized’ and the ‘barbarians’ confront and contact one another; they are also frontiers of status and ethnicity which run through imperialized societies, as in the form of the colonial ‘colour bar’. Here colonizers and colonized are segregated and meet, here slave masters and slaves face one another and here, where imperial posturing is at its most pompous and hatred is most intense, the imperial house of cards folds and paradox takes over. For this frontier is also the locus of a genetic dialectic, a dialectic which, in the midst of the most strenuous contradictions, gives rise to that strangest of cultural and genetic
syntheses – the mulatto, mestizo, half-caste. The mestizo is the personification of the dialectics of empire and emancipation. No wonder that in the age of empire the mestizo was dreaded as a monster, an infertile hybrid, an impossibility: subversive of the foundations of empire and race. The mestizo is the living testimony of an attraction that is being repressed on both sides of the frontier. The mestizo is proof that East and West did meet and that there is humanity on either side. (Nederveen Pieterse, 1989: 360–1)

Hybridity is a Dependent Notion

‘In the struggle against the racism of purity, hybridity invokes the dependent, not converse, notion of the mongrel. Instead of combating essentialism, it merely hybridizes it’ (Friedman, 1999: 236). The mongrel, half-caste, mixed race, métis, mestizo was a taboo figure in the colonial world. When so much pathos was invested in boundaries, boundary crossing involved dangerous liaisons. In an era of thinking in biological terms, boundaries were biologized (‘race’), and by extension so was boundary crossing. Status, class, race, nation were all thought of as biological entities in the lineage from Comte de Boullainvilliers and Gobineau to Houston Stewart Chamberlain and Hitler (cf. Nederveen Pieterse, 1989: Ch. 11).

By the turn of the century, genetics had gone through a paradigm shift from a dominant view that gene mixing was weakening and debilitating (decadence) to the view in Mendelian genetics that gene mixing is invigorating and that combining diverse strains creates ‘hybrid vigour’. This principle still guides plant-breeding companies now. Social and cultural hybridity thinking takes this further and revalorizes the half-castes. The gradual emergence of hybrid awareness (in 19th-century novels, psychoanalysis, modernism, bricolage) and its articulation in the late 20th century can be sociologically situated in the rapid succession of waning aristocracy (as represented in the theme of décadence), bourgeois hegemony and its supersession and reworking from the second half of the 20th century.

Hybridity as a point of view is meaningless without the prior assumption of difference, purity, fixed boundaries. Meaningless not in the sense that it would be inaccurate or untrue as a description, but that, without an existing regard for boundaries, it would not be a point worth making. Without reference to a prior cult of purity and boundaries, a pathos of hierarchy and gradient of difference, the point of hybridity would be moot.

Asserting that all Cultures and Languages are Mixed is Trivial
(Friedman, 1999: 249)

Trivial? When, since time immemorial the dominant idea has been that of pure origins, pure lineages? As in perspectives on language, nation, race, culture, status, class, gender. The hieratic view was preoccupied with divine or sacred origins. The patriarchal view posited strong gender boundaries. The aristocratic view cultivated blue blood. The philological view saw language as the repository of the genius of peoples, as with Herder and the subsequent ‘Aryan’ thesis. The racial view involved a hierarchy of races. The
Westphalian system locked sovereignty within territorial borders. Next came the nation and chauvinism. All these views share a preoccupation with pure origins, strong boundaries, firm borders. The contemporary acknowledgement of mixture in origins and lineages indicates a sea change in subjectivities and consciousness that correlates, of course, with sea changes in social structures and practices. It indicates a different ethos that in time will translate into different institutions. To regard this as trivial is to misread history profoundly.

Hybridity Matters to the Extent that it is Self-identification

Hybridity only exists as a social phenomenon when it is identified as such by those involved in social interaction. This implies that where people do not so identify, the fact of cultural mixture is without social significance . . . hybridity is in the eyes of the beholder, or more precisely in the practice of the beholder. (Friedman, 1999: 249, 251)

Hybrid self-identification is in fact common: obvious instances are second-generation immigrants and indeed hyphenated identities. Tiger Woods, the champion golfer, describes himself as ‘Cablinasian’: ‘a blend of Caucasian, black, Indian and Asian’ (Fletcher, 1997). Donald Yee, who is part black, part Asian and part Native American, can sympathize. ‘When Mr Yee fills out racial questionnaires, he frequently checks “multiracial”. If that is not an option, he goes with either black or Asian. “Nothing bothers me”, he said. “It is just that it doesn’t capture all of me”’ (Fletcher, 1997).

Creolization in the Caribbean, mestizaje in Latin America and fusion in Asia are common self-definitions. In some countries national identity is overtly hybrid. Zanzibar is a classic instance (Gurnah, 1997). Mexico and Brazil identify themselves as hybrid cultures. Nepal is a mélange of Tibetan, Chinese and Indian culture of the Gangetic plains (Bista, 1994) and the same applies to Bhutan. Singapore’s identity is often referred to as Anglo-Chinese (Wee, 1997).

Even so, the view that, in relation to hybridity, only self-identification matters presents several problems. (1) The obvious problem is how to monitor hybrid self-identification since most systems of classification and instruments of measurement do not permit multiple or in between identification. In the United States, ‘Until 1967 states were constitutionally permitted to ban mixed-race marriages. More than half the states had anti-miscegenation statutes in 1945; 19 still had them in 1966’ (Fletcher, 1997). The US census is a case in point. The 2000 census is the first that, after much resistance and amid ample controversy, permits multiple self-identification, i.e. as being white as well as African American, Hispanic, etc. (2) What about the in-betweens? The point of hybridity thinking is that the in-betweens have been numerous all along and because of structural changes have been growing in number. (3) Only the eye of the beholder counts? Going native as epistemological principle? Because most people in the Middle Ages thought the earth is flat, it was flat? Because between 1840
and 1950 many people were racist, there are races? Or, there were as long as most people thought so? Jews were bad when most Germans under National Socialism thought so? Vox populi, vox dei – since when? This is unacceptable in principle and untenable in practice.

**Hybridity Talk is a Function of the Decline of Western Hegemony**

This is true in that the world of Eurocentric colonialism, imperialism and racism is past. It is only partially true because hybridity talk can refer just as much to the passing of other centrisms and hegemonies, such as China the middle kingdom, Japan and the myth of the pure Japanese race (Yoshino, 1995: 24–7), Brahmins in India, Sinhala Buddhists in Sri Lanka and their claim to ‘Aryan’ origins, Israel the Jewish state, Kemalist Turkism centred on Anatolia, Greekness among the Greeks. For all hegemonies, the claim to purity has served as part of a claim to power. This applies to all status boundaries, not just those of nation, ethnicity or race. The Church clamped down on heresies; the aristocracy and then the bourgeoisie despised mésalliance. Status requires boundaries and with boundaries come boundary police.

**Hybridity Talk is Carried by a New Cultural Class of Cosmopolitans who Seek to Establish Hegemony**

Hybridity represents ‘a new “elite” gaze’, ‘a new cosmopolitan elite’ (Friedman, 1999: 236; cf. Ahmad, 1992; Dirlik, 1992). Here innuendo comes in. Ad hominem reasoning, casting aspersions on the motives of the advocates of an idea, rather than debating the idea, is not the most elevated mode of debate. Then, should we discuss the motives of those who talk homogeneity? Of those who talk of boundaries allegedly on behalf of the working class and ‘redneck’ virtues? Of those who create a false opposition between working-class locals and cosmopolitan airheads? According to Friedman, ‘Cosmopolitans are a product of modernity, individuals whose shared experience is based on a certain loss of rootedness. . . . Cosmopolitans identify with the urban, with the “modern”. . . . They are the sworn enemies of national and ethnic identities’ (1999: 237).

Aversion to cosmopolitanism and the decadence of city life was part of Hitler's outlook and the Nazi ideology of blood and soil. With it came the Nazi idealization of the German peasant and, on the other hand, anti-Semitism. According to a German source in 1935: ‘Dangers threaten the nation when it migrates to the cities. It withers away in a few generations, because it lacks the vital connection with the earth. The German must be rooted in the soil, if he wants to remain alive’ (quoted in Linke, 1999: 199).

It is odd to find this combination of elements restated. For one thing, it is an ideological and not an analytical discourse. Brief rejoinders are as follows. (1) The specific discourse of cosmopolitanism does not really belong in this context; there is no necessary relationship. But if it is brought in, one would rather say that humanity is a cosmopolitan species. Adaptability to a variety of ecological settings is inherent in the species. (2) Also if this view is not accepted, cosmopolitanism still pre-dates modernity and goes back to
the intercivilizational travel of itinerant craftsmen, traders and pilgrims. (3) The stereotype that is implicitly invoked here echoes another stereotype, that of the wandering Jew. (4) Why or by which yardstick would or should ‘rootedness’ be the norm? Have nomadism and itineracy not also a long record? (5) Why should affinity with the urban (if it would apply at all) necessarily involve animosity to national and ethnic identities? The Romantics thought otherwise. Cities have been central to national as well as regional identities. (6) According to Friedman, ‘Modernist identity as an ideal type is anti-ethnic, anti-cultural and anti-religious’ (1999: 237). ‘Anti-cultural’ in this context simply does not make sense. Apparently this take on modernism excludes Herder and the Romantics and assumes a single ideal-type modernity.

`While Intellectuals May Celebrate Border-crossing, the Lumpenproletariat Real Border-crossers Live in Constant Fear of the Border’ (Friedman, 1999: 254)

Experiences with borders and boundaries are too complex and diverse to be captured under simple headings. Even where boundaries are strong and fences high, knowing what is on either side is survival knowledge. This is part of the political economy of mobility. Geographical mobility is an alternative key to social mobility. In negotiating borders, hybrid bicultural knowledge and cultural shape-shifting acquire survival value. ‘Passing’ in different milieus is a survival technique. This applies to the large and growing transborder informal sector in which migrant grassroots entrepreneurs turn borders to their advantage (cf. Portes, 1995, 1996, Nederveen Pieterse, 2000a).

Friedman sees it otherwise.

But for whom, one might ask, is such cultural transmigration a reality? In the works of the post-colonial border-crossers, it is always the poet, the artist, the intellectual, who sustains the displacement and objectifies it in the printed word. But who reads the poetry, and what are the other kinds of identification occurring in the lower reaches of social reality? (1997: 97)

(Elsewhere: ‘This author, just as all hybrid ideologues, takes refuge in literature’, 1999: 247.) This is deeply at odds with common experience. Thus, research in English and German major cities finds that it is precisely lower-class youngsters, second-generation immigrants, who now develop new, mixed lifestyles (Räthzel, 1999: 213). Friedman recognizes this among Turks in Berlin but then neutralizes this finding by arguing that ‘the internal dynamics of identification and world-definition aim at coherence’ (1999: 248). Why not? Hybridity is an argument against homogeneity, not against coherence. The point is precisely that homogeneity is not a requirement for coherence.

When Friedman does acknowledge hybridity he shifts the goalposts. ‘Now this combination of cultural elements might be called hybridization,
but it would tell us nothing about the processes involved’ (1999: 248). The processes involved indeed may vary widely. And probably there is something like a stereotyping of hybridity – of world music stamp.

Friedman’s argument against hybridity is inconsistent, contradictory and at times far-fetched, so it is not worth pursuing far. Friedman argues that all cultures are hybrid but that boundaries are not disappearing: these two statements alone are difficult to put together. He argues that hybridity talk is trivial unless it is self-identification, but if hybridity is part of self-identification it is overruled by coherence, and we should examine the processes involved. However, if all cultures are hybrid all along, then the problem is not hybridity but boundaries: how is it that boundaries are historically and socially so significant? How come that while boundaries continuously change shape in the currents and tides of history, boundary fetishism remains, even among social scientists? If hybridity is real but boundaries are prominent, how can hybridity be a self-identification: in a world of boundaries, what room and legitimacy is there for boundary-crossing identities, politically, culturally?

How to situate the anti-hybridity argument? At one level it is another instalment of the critique of ‘postmodernism’, which in these times recurs with different emphases every ten years or so. In the present wave, the polemical emphasis is ‘Marxism versus cultural studies’, which is obviously a broad-stroke target. At another level the argument reflects unease with multiculturalism. When these two lines coincide we get the novel combination of redneck Marxism. In this view multiculturalism is a fad that detracts from, well, class struggle. A positive reading is that this refocuses the attention on political economy, class, social justice and hard politics, which is surely a point worth making in relation to Tinkberbell postmodernism. At the same time, this is an exercise in symbolic politics, unfolding on a narrow canvas, for it mainly concerns positioning within academia. Would this explain why so much is missing from the debate? Among the fundamental considerations that are missing in the anti-hybridity backlash is the historical depth of hybridity viewed in the longue durée. More important still is the circumstance that boundaries and borders can be issues of life and death; and the failure to recognize and acknowledge hybridity is then a political point that may be measured in lives.

Hybridity and the Longue Durée

Hybridization is common in nature. Carrying spurs between flowers, bees and other insects contribute to the variety of flora. While cross-pollination is inherent in nature, hybridity is common in human history as well. Thousands of years of dividing and policing of space, territorial and symbolic, stand between us and our mixed evolutionary and long-term history, or, more precisely, is interspersed with it. Thanks to boundaries, civilizations have flourished and also suffocated. Boundaries have come and gone. Been erected, fought over and then walked over.

Many contemporary debates take as their point of departure recent
history rather than the *longue durée*. According to Friedman, ‘The current stage is one in which culture has begun to overflow its boundaries and mingle with other cultures, producing numerous new breeds or hybrids’ (1999: 237).

A historically more plausible view is that cultures have been overflowing boundaries all along and that boundaries have been provisional and ever contentious superimpositions upon substrata of mingling and traffic. It is not recent times that are the yardstick (or, they would be only from a superficial point of view), but evolutionary times. A distinctive feature of contemporary times is that they are times of *accelerated mixing*. Thus, it is not mixing that is new but the scope and speed of mixing.

Population movements, crosscultural trade, intercultural contact and intermarriage have been common throughout history. Occasionally there have been forced population transfers, diaspora or exile. Sometimes this involved, so to speak, population grafting; in Babylon Alexander compelled 7,000 of his soldiers to marry 7,000 Persian women. At times large public works involved the relocation of thousands of craftsmen.

We can think of hybridity as *layered* in history, including pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial layers, each with distinct sets of hybridity, as a function of the boundaries that were prominent, and accordingly a different pathos of difference. (For colonizing countries, these are pre-colonial, imperial and post-imperial periods. A précis is in Table 3.)

But we should add prehistory as an earlier phase of mixing. The evolutionary backdrop of our common origins in Africa confirms that humanity is a hybrid species. The species’ subsequent ‘clustering’ in different regions of the world has not precluded large-scale contact and population movements across and between the continents (Gamble, 1993). This mixed heritage is confirmed by the ‘cultures’ identified by archaeologists, which in Palaeolithic and Neolithic times sprawl widely and do not coincide with the boundaries of much later times. The diffusion of technologies – of pastoralism, agriculture, horse riding, the stirrup, chariot, saddle, bow and arrow, bronze and iron, and so forth – rapidly and over vast distances, is a further indication of long-distance communication early on (McNeill, 1982). Half the world’s population speaks languages that derive from a single common root, i.e. an Indo-European root (Mallory, 1991). A further indicator is the spread of the ‘world religions’. The spread of diseases and plagues is another marker of episodes of intercultural contact (McNeill, 1977). Besides technologies, language and religions, the travel of symbols is another indicator of crosscultural communication, examined in art history (a fine source is Wittkower, 1989). Anthropologists have studied the travel of customs and foodstuffs. In other words, our foundations are profoundly, structurally, inherently mixed, and it could not be otherwise. Mixing is intrinsic to the evolution of the species. History is a collage.

Superimposed upon the deep strata of mixing in evolutionary time are historical episodes of long-distance crosscultural trade, conquest and empire, and specific episodes such as trans-Atlantic slavery and the triangular trade. Within and across these levels we can distinguish further types of hybridity.
Taking a political economy approach we can identify the following general types of historical hybridity:

- **Hybridity across modes of production.** This gives rise to mixed social formations. It entails combinations between hunting/gathering and cultivation or pastoralism, agriculture and industry, craft and industry, etc. within and across social formations. Semi-feudalism and feudal capitalism are other instances. As the classic debate on the articulation of modes of production demonstrates (Foster-Carter, 1978), modes of production did not simply succeed one another but coexisted.

- **Hybridity before and after industrialization.** The agricultural revolution was the first major break in history and industrialization was the second, introducing a global development gap. The year 1800 is a marker, indicating the first use of fossil fuels (in the steam engine).

- **Hybrid modes of regulation.** The social market, Fordism, market socialism and the Third Way are examples of mixed forms of regulation.12

Besides nations with overtly hybrid identities, there are *hybrid regions* or zones, such as the Sudanic belt in Africa, that straddle geographic and cultural areas. Southeast Asia is a region of hybrid Indo-Chinese and Malay features. *Hybrid cities* are typically located at civilizational crossroads, major arteries of trade, or involve significant immigrant populations. Istanbul, Venice and Toledo are classic instances. Baghdad and Cairo, Lahore and Delhi, Calcutta and Bombay are other examples.13 Also, in nations where hybridity does not form part of national identity, it looms in the background. A caption in a museum in Norway notes that a particular type of jewellery is found ‘from Dublin to the Volga’. Regional and folklore museums usually reveal the transborder cultural continuities that national museums militantly ignore; they relate to deeper cultural strata and a different historical awareness.

Against the backdrop of deep time, the current hybridity discussion
seems superficial, for it is entirely dominated by the episodes of colonialism and nationalism of the last hundred or couple of hundred years. What is striking is the spell these episodes cast, and the preoccupation with boundaries this involves (cf. Nederveen Pieterse, 2000b).

**Boundaries**

In the USA, demographers speak of a silent explosion in the number of mixed-race people. Between 1960 and 1990, the number of interracial married couples rose from 150,000 to more than 1.1 million, and the number of interracial children leaps accordingly. ‘Since 1970, the number of mixed-race children in the United States has quadrupled. And there are six times as many intermarriages today as there were in 1960’ (Etzioni, 1997). No wonder that a commentator observes:

> Look at Tiger Woods and see the face of America’s future . . . it was Tiger Woods’ face that provided the real benchmark – showing how far Americans have come on an unstoppable national journey: the journey from the time-honored myth of racial clarity to the all-mixed-up reality of multiracialism. (Overholser, 2000)

In addition to the choice of 16 racial categories that the Census Bureau used to offer Americans, Etzioni and others proposed a new ‘multiracial’ category. This idea has been infuriating to some African American leaders, who regard it as undermining black solidarity. ‘African-American leaders also object to a multiracial category because race data are used to enforce civil rights legislation in employment, voting rights, housing and mortgage lending, health care services and educational opportunities’ (Etzioni, 1997). The proponents argue that this category – and a ‘category of “multietnic” origin, which most Americans might wish to check’ – would help soften the racial and ethnic divisions that now run through American society. This is only an example of the clash between the politics of recognition based on the allocation of collective rights and the idea of fluid group boundaries.

Most of the world population now lives on less than $2 a day while a few hundred billionaires own as much as half the world population. Technical explanations for the world’s development gaps are many but insufficient. A superficial impression has it that there is a lack of circulation or flow. On the whole, human capacities are evenly spread and capacitation or empowerment is possible, so presumably what stands in the way are boundaries, barriers or borders of various kinds. Ecology and geography map bio-regions and climate zones. Boundaries are a central theme in social science (cf. Moore and Buchanan, 2001). Economics measures boundaries such as GNP and income; micro-economics examines investment and location strategies; political science studies systems of organization and representation within given boundaries; sociology examines how boundaries such as nation, class, caste, region inform social practices. But, invariably, it is through cultural codes that boundaries are experienced, lived, upheld.
We could follow this with a history of boundaries – boundaries of clan, tribe, language, region, culture, civilization, empire, religion, state, nation, race, ethnicity, and a history of centrisms, i.e. hegemonic positions of power and points of view from which social landscapes have been viewed, mapped and defined. These boundaries have at no time precluded cross-border contact, but attempts have been made to control it. We could then follow with a history of boundary and border-crossing, smuggling, piracy, crosscultural traffic, migration, travel, diaspora, pilgrimage, trade: the hybridity angle on history unsettles the boundaries as well as the codes that sustain them.

Boundary Fetishism and Life and Death

According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, in the 20th century 167,000,000 to 175,000,000 lives have been deliberately extinguished through politically motivated carnage (quoted in Hirsch, 1995: xii). If we consider this death toll, a major and perhaps a greater part of ethnonationalist and ethnic killing involves internecine strife, i.e. political factions eliminating competitors within their own camp. The targets include crossover factions who threaten to blur the lines of conflict, rivals for leadership, forces that defy the political and military hegemony of the leading faction, and all those who would wage peace rather than war. Episodes of ‘ethnic cleansing’, genocide, communal violence and civil war involve the militant suppression of the in-between, the elimination of hybridity. This refers to political as well as cultural in-betweens.

In Bosnia, about a third of the population was hybrid – intermarried or of mixed parentage – but none of the wartime counts of Bosnian Moslems, Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs acknowledged this.

No provisions are made for the more than 26 percent of the population that is intermarried, for the substantial numbers of urban dwellers who refused to describe themselves as either Serbs, Muslims, or Croats in the last census; or for the Serbs and Croats who support and have fought for the Bosnian government against their ethnic fellow nations that are trying to destroy Bosnia. All of that has been buried under the assumption that the only civic links that remain in Bosnia are those of the ethnic community. (Denitch, 1994: 7; cf. Nederveen Pieterse, 1998b)

The opportunistic and political character of the markers of ‘ethnicity’ has also been apparent in Bosnia:

... each side will alternately emphasize their common roots when it indeed suits its purposes. Before the war, for example, when the Serbs still hoped to keep Bosnia in Yugoslavia, the media frequently highlighted similarities with the Muslims, while Croats often stressed that Bosnia had been part of historical Croatia and that most Bosnian Muslims were originally of Croatian descent. (Bell-Falkoff, 1993: 121)

In Vojvodina, the region of former Yugoslavia where cultural mixing, measured by rate of intermarriage, was highest, conflict was absent (Botev,
1994). In the region where intermarriage was lowest, at 0.2 per cent in Kosovo, conflict was sparked off.

**Different Cultural Takes on Hybridity**

Hybridity involves different meanings not only across time but also across cultural contexts. In ‘high’ and classical cultural settings, the gatekeepers of ‘standards’ easily repudiate hybridity as infringement of the classical canon (without awareness or acknowledgement of the ‘mixed’ character of the canon itself). In popular culture, mixing of elements and styles may pass unnoticed, be taken for granted or welcomed (Frow, 1992). Creativity and innovation often turn on unlikely combinations, so in art and sciences hybridity is common and at times more readily acknowledged than in other domains.

Hybridity carries different meanings in different cultures, among different strata within cultures and at different times. Radhakrishnan (1996) distinguishes between metropolitan and peripheral hybridity; but the meaning of hybridity is not the same in all peripheries. The meaning of hybridity or in-between space differs according to the way it has come about.

In Asia on the whole it carries a different ring than in Latin America. In Asia the general feeling has been upbeat, as in East–West fusion culture. Hybridity tends to be experienced as chosen, willed (although there are plenty sites of conflict). In Latin America the feeling has long been one of fracture, fragmentation, *tiempos mixtos*. Hybridity used to be experienced as a fateful condition that was inflicted rather than willed. An example is the Mexican ‘Malinche complex’ discussed by Octavio Paz (1967; Papastergiadis, 1997). This goes back to the original duality at the foundation of the Latin American experience: the experience of conquest and the divide between *criollos* and *indigenes*, which has led to Latin American societies being characterized as ‘dual societies’. (A diagnosis that ignores other identities such as descendants of African slaves, Asian immigrants, and again the in-betweens, the Ladinos.) However, in recent Latin American accounts, the notion of hybridity as an affliction has changed, along with growing recognition of popular creativity (e.g. Canclini, 1995, 2000; Ortiz, 2000). ‘Latinity’ as bricolage is now a common perception.

A common theme in Asia is Western technology/Eastern values. In everyday discourse one often hears of the negative consequences of rapid modernization, for instance in Indonesia: ‘Just how successful has the government been at developing the spiritual and cultural sectors in order to counter the negative impacts of rapid modernization?’ (*Jakarta Post*, 9 March 1995). Modernization has never been universally embraced and there has been a wide spectrum of interests and positions which, however, have typically been interpreted through the lens of modernity, with modernity as a yardstick, from ‘traditionalists’ to ‘modernizers’, anti or pro-modernization stances, and notions of conservative or defensive modernization.

In sub-Saharan Africa, key themes in relation to modernity have been traditional social institutions and values – as in négritude, African socialism
and *ujama*. Slavery, the gun–slave cycle and European colonialism have been important episodes in interrupting, side-tracking the development of African societies. Here colonialism has been closer and more destructive than anywhere else and decolonization has been most recent. Revisionist history informs Afrocentric readings of Egyptian civilization and the ancients, and indigenization informs language politics and Afrocentric ethnoscology. At the same time, ‘reworking modernity’ is also a prominent strand in African societies (Pred and Watts, 1992).

It would not be difficult to make a general case for modernization and development in the South as processes of hybridization. To an extent this terminology is already being used. Bayart (1992) refers to social and political ‘hybridation’ to characterize African modernities. Hybridity is a common terminology in Latin America, and in Asia terms such as fusion are common. Neotraditionalism is common and another example is neopatriarchy in the Arab world (Sharabi, 1988). Everywhere there is a language of combinations, articulations and improvisations to describe the various changes in the wake of anticolonialism, decolonization and development.

In the West, hybridity thinking is à la mode but borders persist – witness the issues of migration, racism and illegal aliens, the class divisions of the ghettos and the ‘two-thirds society’, and the vagaries of international development discourse. Still, it makes a huge difference whether the argument is that there is too much multiculturalism or not enough, and this remains unclear in the anti-hybridity argument.

**Patterns of Hybridity**

In cultural, literary and postcolonial studies, hybridity, syncretism, creolization, *métissage* have become common tropes. Usually the reference is to cultural rather than institutional or structural hybridity. Hybridity is fast becoming a routine, almost trite point of reference in studies of global culture that speak of the ‘mongrel world’ and the ‘hybridity factor’ (Zachary, 2000; cf. Iyer, 2000). Yet, as hybridity becomes a ubiquitous attribute or quality, by the same token it becomes increasingly meaningless, a universal soup: if everything is hybrid, what does hybridity mean? Hence the next question to come up is what kind of hybridity? Radhakrishnan (1996) distinguishes between metropolitan (ludic) and postcolonial (critical) hybridity, Bhavnani (1999) between situational and organic hybridity. Patterns of hybridity in relation to modes of production and regulation are explored above. A major objection to hybridity is that it sidesteps power differences: ‘hybridity is not parity’. So the critical variable is power.

Thus, in assessing varieties of multiculturalism, pertinent criteria are power and equality, or degrees of symmetry and the extent to which culture is centred on a standard or canon. *Mestizaje* in Latin America has a cultural centre of gravity; it is an ideology of whitening, Europeanization, parallel to modernization (Klor de Alva, 1995). Creolization in the Caribbean is more fluid, although it remains centred on ‘browning’ (Thompson, 1999). A précis of two patterns of hybridity is in Table 4.
So What?

It is not obvious why the term ‘hybridity’ has stuck as the general heading for these phenomena. As a word it came of age in the 19th century (Young, 1995: 6). In French ‘bricolage’ has long been a common term. Mixing, blending, melding and merging are other terms and nuances with longer lineages than the quasi-scientific term ‘hybridity’. Mixing plays a part in agriculture (mixing crops), cooking (ingredients), weaving (tissues, motifs), healing (herbs, methods), art (genres, materials), fashion (styles), etc. The amalgamation and fusion of different substances are fundamental processes in alchemy, producing transubstantiation or decay. This returns in chemistry, metallurgy (alloys) and the pharmaceutical industry. Osmosis plays a part in cell biology and chemistry. Why of all terms hybridity has stuck is probably because of the preoccupation with biological and ‘racial’ differences and the intellectual imprint of genetics, which are essentially eighteenth and 19th-century problematics.15

Now let’s come back to the original question, ‘Hybridity, so what?’ In an earlier discussion I asked, ‘How do we come to terms with phenomena such as Thai boxing by Moroccan girls in Amsterdam, Asian rap in London, Irish bagels, Chinese tacos . . . ?’ etc. (Nederveen Pieterse, 1995: 53). Friedman cites this and asks ‘What is it that we must come to terms with here?’ (1999: 236). What we must come to terms with is the circumstance that nowadays we are all ‘Moroccan girls doing Thai boxing in Amsterdam’, that is we are all mixing cultural elements and traces across places and identities.16 This is not simply an issue of classification or of elite cosmopolitan experience; rather, the point is that this has become an ordinary experience. A Greek restaurant called ‘Ipanema’ serving Italian food in Brighton: these crossovers are now common in all spheres of life.

This is only the tip of the iceberg. Boundaries themselves are tricky. Thus, the meanings of boundaries are by no means constant. For instance, Fiona Wilson (2000) discusses the radically changing meanings of

Table 4 Patterns of hybridity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Axes</th>
<th>Implications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric/symmetric</td>
<td>The relative power and status of elements in the mixture. E.g. colonial society is asymmetric. These are polarities of a continuum, of which the perfectly symmetric extreme may be difficult to give an example of.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With/without centre</td>
<td>Hybridities with or without a centre are polarities of a continuum. Again it is difficult to think of an example of completely free-floating mixture, for even at a carnival the components are always charged with different values, polarities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So What?

It is not obvious why the term ‘hybridity’ has stuck as the general heading for these phenomena. As a word it came of age in the 19th century (Young, 1995: 6). In French ‘bricolage’ has long been a common term. Mixing, blending, melding and merging are other terms and nuances with longer lineages than the quasi-scientific term ‘hybridity’. Mixing plays a part in agriculture (mixing crops), cooking (ingredients), weaving (tissues, motifs), healing (herbs, methods), art (genres, materials), fashion (styles), etc. The amalgamation and fusion of different substances are fundamental processes in alchemy, producing transubstantiation or decay. This returns in chemistry, metallurgy (alloys) and the pharmaceutical industry. Osmosis plays a part in cell biology and chemistry. Why of all terms hybridity has stuck is probably because of the preoccupation with biological and ‘racial’ differences and the intellectual imprint of genetics, which are essentially eighteenth and 19th-century problematics.15

Now let’s come back to the original question, ‘Hybridity, so what?’ In an earlier discussion I asked, ‘How do we come to terms with phenomena such as Thai boxing by Moroccan girls in Amsterdam, Asian rap in London, Irish bagels, Chinese tacos . . . ?’ etc. (Nederveen Pieterse, 1995: 53). Friedman cites this and asks ‘What is it that we must come to terms with here?’ (1999: 236). What we must come to terms with is the circumstance that nowadays we are all ‘Moroccan girls doing Thai boxing in Amsterdam’, that is we are all mixing cultural elements and traces across places and identities.16 This is not simply an issue of classification or of elite cosmopolitan experience; rather, the point is that this has become an ordinary experience. A Greek restaurant called ‘Ipanema’ serving Italian food in Brighton: these crossovers are now common in all spheres of life.

This is only the tip of the iceberg. Boundaries themselves are tricky. Thus, the meanings of boundaries are by no means constant. For instance, Fiona Wilson (2000) discusses the radically changing meanings of
the categories of Indian and mestizo over time and by class in Andean Peru. 
More revealing still is that boundaries are often bricolage improvisations 
themselves. Thus, the claims of racial, ethnic and religious ‘fundamental-
isms’ are often pieced together from diverse and hybrid sources. For 
instance, Stephen Howe (1998) shows how Afrocentrism derives several of 
its claims and methods from European sources. All this does not mean that 
boundaries fade or vanish; they probably never will because boundaries are 
a function of social life. It does not mean that the emotions associated with 
boundaries wane, or their consequences, such as racist murder. Then, does 
this mean that ‘hybridity’, as so many argue, is merely a plaything of a bour-
geois elite? Rather the point is that the flux of our times is such that, across 
classes, the contingency of boundaries is now a more common experience 
than ever before.

Hybridity is a terminology and sensibility of our time in that boundary 
and border-crossing mark our times. Thus, with regard to national borders 
these are times of post-nationalism (the high tide of nationalism was between 
1840 and 1960). Sovereignty changes meaning and is now increasingly 
being pooled in regional and international arrangements and covenants; 
neomedievalism is one of the accounts for current political conditions 
(Kobrin, 1998). Class and gender boundaries are less strict than before. 
Aesthetic boundaries are increasingly permeable, with high and low cultures 
mingling. In the sciences, disciplinary boundaries are increasingly old-
fashioned. And so on.

As a perspective, hybridity entails three different sets of claims: 
empirical (hybridization happens), theoretical (acknowledging hybridity as 
an analytical tool) and normative (a critique of boundaries and valorization 
of mixtures, under certain conditions, in particular relations of power). 
Hybridity is to culture what deconstruction is to discourse: transcending 
binary categories. Another account of hybridity is ‘in-betweenness’. Recogn-
izing the in-between and the interstices means going beyond dualism, binary 
thinking and Aristotelian logic. Methodologically this is the hallmark of 
post-structuralism and deconstruction; it represents an epistemological shift 
outside the boxes of Cartesian epistemology. Postmodernism has been a 
general heading for this change in outlook. In its constructive sense this 
involves a profound moment of collective reflexivity that includes the aware-
ness that boundaries are historical and social constructions; they are also 
cognitive barriers whose validity depends on epistemic orders, which are 
ultimately of an arbitrary or at least contingent nature. This awareness in 
itself is not new; what is new is its expansion among broader strata of the 
population and its widening scope in relation to phenomena. Thomas Kuhn 
on paradigm shifts in science, the emergence of ‘new science’ beyond New-
tonian science, Foucault on epistemic orders, Derrida on deconstruction, 
Deleuze and Guattari on nomadism, feminist boundary crossings (e.g. Caine 
et al., 1988), Lyotard on the space in between language games, Bhabha on 
‘third space’, etc. – these are all different moments and ways of stepping out 
of the Cartesian box of knowledge and order.
This overall movement has so many ramifications that its significance is difficult to map – as if any mapping exercise in the process validates maps, while the point is to recognize the limited and contingent status of any kind of map. One account is that the space across and between boundaries is a liminal space and current changes involve liminality of a kind becoming a collective awareness.\(^{19}\) This awareness may be described as a kind of Trickster knowledge, in which the Trickster is the joker in the pack, the jester, the fool, the shape-shifter who does not take seriously what all society around regards as sacred rules. Along the Mexican–US border, people smugglers are nicknamed ‘coyotes’. Among Native Americans, Coyote is a Trickster figure, like Anansi the spider and Brer Rabbit elsewhere. In this sense, hybridity consciousness represents a return of the Trickster, now at a collective scale.

This does not mean that boundary-crossing is a free-for-all. There is free cheese only in the mousetrap. As some boundaries wane others remain or are introduced. Thus, as national borders and governmental authority erode, ethnic or religious boundaries, or boundaries of consumption patterns and brand names emerge in their place. NGOs carve out new spaces of power. Or, as some boundaries fade, people’s differential capacities for border-crossing and mobility come to foreground. In virtual space, cognitive boundaries and cyberwars emerge. Another complex issue is the relationship between hybridity and ecological biodiversity. Acknowledging the contingency of boundaries and the significance and limitations of hybridity as a theme and approach means engaging hybridity politics. This is where critical hybridity comes in, which involves a new awareness of and new take on the dynamics of group formation and social inequality. This critical awareness is furthered by acknowledging rather than by suppressing hybridity.

Notes

This article was originally prepared for the panel ‘Whatever Happened to Hybridity?’ organized by Kobena Mercer at the Vera List Center for Art and Politics of the New School for Social Research, New York, April 2000. Cordial thanks to Kobena Mercer and Alev Cinar for comments on an earlier version.

1. For example in the work of Hall, Bhabha, Gilroy, Hannerz, Hebdige, Appadurai, Rushdie, Garcia Canclini.
2. Of course this makes sense only as a contextual statement. But I weary of such identity proclamations.
3. An interesting discussion of this period is Hughes (1958).
4. ‘In Latin *hybrida* originally meant the offspring of a tame sow and a wild boar’ (Cashmore, 1996: 165).
5. Nederveen Pieterse (1995) mentions structural hybridization such as ‘cities of peasants’ and ‘agro-industry’.
objections to hybridity thinking (1997: 10–11) and then gives a different take on ‘critical reflexivity and posthybridity as narrative engagement’ (76–114).

7. Benita Parry (1987) argued against the hybridity view as privileging discourse which ignores the material realities of colonialism, a line of thinking that was taken further by Ahmad (1992). Another source is Žižek (1997).

8. I have argued that this pathos only dates from after 1800 (Nederveen Pieterse, 1994).

9. Hybridity and multiple identity among second- and third-generation immigrants are abundantly discussed. For example, on Asian Americans see Lowe (1991), Liu (1998), Tamayo Lott (1997), Yang et al. (1997), and on Korean Americans, Hyun (1995). A different theme is Japanese influence in the United States (e.g. Conor, 1991; Feinberg, 1991) and vice versa, changes in Japan (e.g. Kosuka, 1989).

10. This kind of angle is apparent in Friedman’s work and in Žižek (1997). That Marxism and anti-multiculturalism need not coincide is illustrated by the work of McLaren.

11. Besides confirming the evolutionary ‘out of Africa’ thesis, Luigi Cavalli-Sforza (2000) documents a tree of human evolution: a branching diagram of relations among different populations. He shows that the European population is the most genetically mixed-up on earth, quite contrary to Comte de Gobineau who ascribed European genius to their being the most genetically pure and the least weakened by racial mixture. This matches the current findings of human genome research: there is only one race – the human race; 99.9 per cent of the human genome is the same in everyone. So-called racial differences are genetically only skin-deep (Angier, 2000).

12. Considering that all forms of regulation (in the sense of the French regulation school) are historically developed, arguably there are no ‘pure’ forms of regulation.

13. Now cities generally are characterized as hybrid: ‘cities are essentially culturally hybrid’ (Amin et al., 2000: vi).


15. Ayse Caglar (personal communication) notes that cross-class mixtures are rarely referred to as hybrid (cf. the old terminology of mésalliance). It would apply to phenomena such as the newly rich; but cf. Robison and Goodman (1996).

16. What is globalization? In answer to this question a Pakistani colleague recounts: ‘An English Princess (Princess Diana) with an Egyptian boyfriend, uses a Norwegian mobile telephone, crashes in a French tunnel in a German car with a Dutch engine, driven by a Belgian driver, who was high on Scottish whiskey, followed closely by Italian Paparazzi, on Japanese motorcycles, treated by an American doctor, assisted by Filipino para-medical staff, using Brazilian medicines, dies!’

17. Thus, Niru Ratnam asks ‘Can hybridity even begin to deal with issues such as the Lawrence murder?’ and observes ‘hybridity is simply not the language of Eltham, South London’ (1999: 156, 158).


19. In anthropology liminality refers to Arnold van Gennep’s rites of passage between different states and Victor Turner’s ‘liminal space’ as a space of transformation. In postcolonial studies, Bhabha refers to the liminal as an interstitial passage between fixed identifications. Limen, a new journal for the theory and
practice of liminal phenomena published in Croatia (2001) seeks to address the ‘liminal generation in-between industrial and post-industrial, socialism and capitalism, etc.’

References


---

**Jan Nederveen Pieterse** is Associate Professor of sociology at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague. His research interests include globalization, development studies and cultural studies. He is the author of several books, co-editor of *Review of International Political Economy* and advisory editor of several journals. Further information is on the web site [www.noparking.demon.nl].