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RESPONSE TO COMMENTARIES

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I am grateful to the authors for their comments and to the journal editors for sharing an interest in the theme. It is in the nature of these exchanges that disagreements loom large, but first let me note the agreements, or at any rate the apparent absence of dispute (the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence). There appears to be no dispute on taking a sociology of global knowledge approach, nor that global studies should be kaleidoscopic and adopt interdisciplinary, multicentric, and multi-level approaches. The main idea that global studies represents global 3.0 (following global data 1.0 and studies of globalization 2.0) seems to generate little dispute; one author dissents, which is the very minimum one could expect from a debate. This narrows the parameters of debate. Let me take the comments one by one and, without dwelling on the agreements (of course, there are many), focus on points of dispute, and particularly those that advance the discussion.

Habib Khondker takes the rise of global studies back to Marx, Marxist economists, and Wallerstein. In his view, ‘the logic of economic system has been world-systemic since the birth of capitalism’ (2013, this issue). Here I disagree on several points. Starting the rise of the global with the birth of capitalism is a Eurocentric fallacy and a classic, narrow version of global 2.0. Studies of conquest (Herodotus, Thucydides, Plutarch), empire (Gibbon), trade routes (Pirenne, Braudel), civilization, knowledge, religion (Jaspers, Toynbee, Needham, McNeill), migrations and diasporas (Curtin, Hoerder) take us deeper back in time, are arguably just as relevant, and have deep research lineages. As an aside, it is interesting to note for instance how many medieval Arab scholars are known as the founders of fields (al-Zahrawi, the ‘father of modern surgery’; Alhazen, the ‘father of modern optics’; Averroes, the ‘father of rationalism’; Ibn Khaldun, the father of sociology, etc.). In other words, there probably was life before capitalism.

According to Khondker, ‘theories of globalization were built on the macro-theories of social change. “Globalization can best be understood as a reaction to and elaboration of two main
sociological approaches: the world systems and the modernization approaches” (Nas, 1998, p. 182). To the extent that this is true for sociology it is, in my view, part of the problem and exemplifies the fallacies of globalization studies: first, the theories are disciplinary, so sociological perspectives are taken as yardsticks of the global; second, the approach is theory-led; third, it introduces two ruptures, the sixteenth century ‘birth of capitalism’ and modernization, with its antecedents in the Enlightenment. This illustrates how disciplinary theories burden and mortgage globalization thinking (for wider discussion see Nederveen Pieterse, 2012).

James Mittelman takes the same point of departure: ‘The point that I would stress is that global and globalization studies concern the dynamics of capitalism in all its varieties and in sundry domains’ (2013, this issue). The same criticism applies: this perspective is narrow in principle and Eurocentric and presentist in application. The general rule is: the later the timing of globalization, the more Eurocentric the perspective. Capitalism and modernity are the two cornerstones of Eurocentric history; they place two caesuras in history, 1500 and 1800, which both cast Europe as the lead actor of ‘modern history’.

Mittelman rightly draws attention to the ‘knowledge–power nexus’: ‘naming is not a game, for it is inscribed with interests and pressures that structure knowledge production. Under current conditions, the challenge is to … push back the confluence of security and market forces repurposing programs and the university itself away from their core missions’ (2013, this issue). I totally agree. Discourse analysis of categories, headings, and the politics of naming are essential. This includes the sociology of knowledge and contextualization of area studies (the cold war era), regional studies, international relations, and global governance. In my view, this should include categories such as ‘global capitalism’. According to Mittelman, ‘Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin’s The Making of Global Capitalism (2012) skillfully explains the intricate connections between capitalism and the US state, which, they maintain, serves as an informal empire and superintends the restructuring of other states’ (2013, this issue).

This reiterates the focus on capitalism, elevates it to global capitalism, and twins it with the familiar trope of American hegemony. This short-circuits the entire discussion abruptly. In a single sweep, globalization = capitalism = global capitalism = American hegemony. This is both thoroughly conventional (30 years of, by now, clichés passing for critical knowledge) and fundamentally counterproductive. Instead of problematizing the global, we get it wrapped and delivered in an all-in-one package. Viewing globalization as driven by American hegemony works for the twentieth century but is out of sync with contemporary trends such as the rise of the BRICS states. If American hegemony were sufficient as an analytic, why do we now have the G20?

Mittelman (2004, pp. 224–225) pleads for critical globalization studies that should be reflexive, historicist, and decentered and engage crossovers and strategic transformations, which is a strong agenda. In my view, reflexivity should include problematizing capitalism as a category and a historicist approach should include epochs preceding the sixteenth century rise of capitalism. Since this theme returns in another comment, I will come back to this issue towards the end of my response.

Thomas Misco (2013, this issue) is concerned with pedagogy and social studies education and Richard Appelbaum (2013, this issue) raises the question of global studies methodology. I share their concerns.

In his thoughtful contribution, Benjamin Nienass contributes several engaging references to Appadurai’s ‘constructs, inflected by the situatedness of actors’ and Beck’s rediscovery of the national as ‘the internalized global’. The former refers to positionality, which is profoundly relevant to how the global is viewed (and is one of the premises of multi-centrism), and the latter refers to the nation as a phase and expression of globalization, a point made earlier by Robertson. John Urry’s observation
that there is a performative element to thematizing the global—to global knowledge and global studies—which therefore *generates* new knowledge demands is also insightful.

I part company with him on one point, the global reach of the Holocaust. While Nienass formulates this with circumspection and refers to wider debate, he concludes on the note that Holocaust memory would serve as ‘a promise to a universalistic future’ (2013, this issue). I think that, on balance, the opposite is true. The memory of the Holocaust, not per se but as it is institutionalized in the American Holocaust industry and manipulated by successive Israeli governments, in effect serves as ethnocentric exceptionalism dressed up and masquerading as humanist universalism. Several problems are familiar: monopolizing the term holocaust for a single episode is biased. Viewing the Holocaust as a historical singularity has been criticized (Bauman, 1989). Transatlantic slavery; the genocide and forced removal of Native Americans; the Armenian genocide; massacres in El Salvador, Guatemala, Biafra, and Rwanda, have also been holocausts. The American Holocaust industry cements the US–Israel alliance and sustains the festering impasse of Israel–Palestine relations. If the memory of genocide is worth keeping, which surely it is, it is equally worth taking heed of other and contemporary genocides and suffering and doing so in a way that does not overshadow them. This includes the suffering of Palestinians and the persistent denial of their right to self-determination. The ritualized commemoration of the Holocaust elevates the suffering of European Jews and sidelines the suffering of others.

Kevin Archer addresses my paper head-on; his commentary is the most polemical and the most entertaining. Archer, a geographer, does not see the point of global studies. In his view, globalization research is already interdisciplinary, multicentric and multi-level. He mentions world-systems, Wallerstein, Chase-Dunn, and Abu-Lughod; Castells on global networks; Harvey’s work on time–space compression; Sassen’s work on glocalizing processes; and work ranging from Appadurai to postcolonial studies. According to Archer, ‘such studies of globalization actually represent a substantive improvement over global studies hereby presented. Each approach to globalization mentioned is thoroughly theorized, from the Braudelian- and Marxian-inspired world-systems take, to the logic of capitalism approaches of Harvey and Sassen, on to the post-colonialism of Chakrabarty, Dirlik, and, more loosely, Appadurai’ (2013, this issue).

The reason why my distinction between globalization research and global studies is measured (it should not be overdrawn) is that there is much globalization research that is rich and nuanced. The reason why I nevertheless make a case for global studies as global 3.0 is that globalization research is also a mixed bag, highly uneven and burdened by macro-theories that are past their sell-by date. The point of stating objectives for global 3.0 (interdisciplinary: kaleidoscopic, multicentric, multi-level, reflexive) is not that they are novel (of course they are not), but is to make these features explicit and programmatic and to make that which may be marginal and occasional, central and methodical; it is about making the background foreground. In addition, global 3.0 refers to theory spring-cleaning.

Several of Archer’s points of reference are not multicentric, but he does not make the distinction. Wallerstein’s approach is avowedly centrist (a single world-system) and Eurocentric (‘the birth of the modern world-system’ etc.). The extent to which his work is multidimensional and multi-level has been in dispute. Chase-Dunn’s work is multicentric; it recognizes multiple world-systems and is concerned with comparative world-system studies; Abu-Lughod’s work is multicentric as well. Both share, although less so Abu-Lughod, the features of world-system analysis. Sassen’s work on global cities centered on the Triad economies has top-down features (the notion of nodal cities is more flexible and productive), which she has
corrected in later work. ‘And aren’t media studies, cultural studies, and political economy themselves already interdisciplinary by their very nature?’ They are, but they are not necessarily multi-level or multicentric; several are Eurocentric or west-centric—which is a familiar point (Curran and Park, 2000).

In globalization research, I single out anthropology and geography. Both are concerned with local—global interplay and fieldwork and comparative studies play a large part in both, so they are suppler, closer to the ground and less driven by macro-theories than sociology and political economy. It is the unreflected reliance on macro-theories that makes much globalization research predictable and, at times, hostage to circular, functionalist, or teleological reasoning. Appadurai’s work straddles anthropology and is less burdened by macro-theories, as is the case in Castells’s work. Postcolonial studies are uneven: Chakrabarty’s work is accomplished in decentering Europe, but in the process recenters modernity (as in his turn to Marx and Heidegger).

The issue is not theory per se, but what kind of theory. If globalization research is superior to global studies because it is theorized, what kind of theory probably matters. World-system analysis is an amalgam of Marxism, dependency theory, and Braudel, all of which represent different theoretical outlooks. Which, actually, is the superior perspective? Harvey and Dirlik are concerned with ‘the logic of capitalism’. But, just as in relation to Khondker and Mittelman, this raises many questions. Surely globalization is often equated with economic globalization, and in turn with capitalism, so no wonder this is a hot potato. Since the ‘logic of capitalism’ leads in three commentaries, it is worth spelling out what questions this poses. I will raise them briefly.

First, why privilege capitalism? As mentioned above: trade and trade routes long pre-date capitalism; migrations and diffusion of knowledge, technology, religion, and culture have a wider range, and without them ‘modern capitalism’ could not function. Thus singling out capitalism as the take-off point for the global implies a contradiction, because it presupposes many infrastructures that are prerequisites for the rise of capitalism.

Second, if capitalism is taken as the point of take-off for the global, when did capitalism begin, in the 1500s, following Marx and Wallerstein, in the 1100s, following Braudel and Abu-Lughod, or earlier still, following Frank and Hobson? As Abu-Lughod and others show, the Levant trade presupposes many other trade links and horizons.

Third, this refers to capitalism in which sense? Braudel viewed capitalism as the domain of monopolies and rent-seeking, perched above the market economy—a perspective that differs markedly from that of mainstream economics. Braudel also disagreed with Wallerstein’s preoccupation with the ‘long sixteenth century’. Frank, in later work (1996), proposed abandoning the category of capitalism altogether for trade routes and shifting centers of accumulation.

Fourth, is capitalism a singular construct, or should we rather speak of capitalisms? If we assume the singular, it means in effect to marginalize the contestations within and between capitalisms. Mittelman mentions capitalism and its varieties, but what is the status of the varieties? Recent work deals with ‘variegated capitalism’ (Peck and Theodore, 2007) and uneven neoliberalization (Brenner et al., 2010), which are relevant improvements but still take neoliberalization as the overriding logic, with unevenness in the margins and the specifics. Is there then a single overriding logic of capitalism, with varieties on the side? The upshot is that many accounts capture neither the diversity nor the friction of capitalisms. Thus according to Harvey (2005), contemporary China is another franchise of neoliberalism, which has been disputed (e.g. Arrighi, 2007). I characterize Harvey’s approach as ‘neoliberalism everywhere’ (Nederveen Pieterse, 2011). One of the problems of the European Union, besides uneven development, is that it includes different capitalisms—liberal (UK), coordinated (Germany), and state-led market economies (France)—and hence presents difficult balancing acts for the European Central Bank and Brussels. Which,
then, is ‘the logic of capitalism’? In the austerity-stimulus debates (Blyth, 2013), which is ‘the logic of capitalism’? Using the plural, the logics of capitalisms is the wiser option.

Fifth, is global capitalism a valid category? If we assume the singular and add the global (the modern world-system, global capitalism, the capitalist system, etc.), the implication is convergence theory. The category ‘global capitalism’ by its nature focuses the attention on dominant capitalism. If we reject convergence theory in modernization theory, in Thatcher’s ‘there is no alternative’ and in the Washington Consensus, and vehemently so, why then should we embrace it in categories such as global capitalism? If we reject convergence theory as a hegemonic cliché on the right, why should we applaud it on the left? Part of the package is the routinized slander of the welfare state, which has been ongoing for 30 years, and the expectation that emerging economies will sooner or later converge on the American model, which is duly measured in indices such as the Economic Freedom Index and institutionalized in norms such as good governance. Global capitalism assumes a view from the center with convergence built in. But what if the momentum and the center of hegemony are shifting, as they have since the 2008 crisis? If capitalism is a single global system, then the dominant form of capitalism—neoliberalism—is the global standard, economies converge on this model, and a crisis in the dominant zone is a global crisis. If, however, the 1997–1998 crisis in East Asia was deemed an Asian crisis, why should we treat crisis in the US and Europe as a global crisis, rather than as a regional crisis with global spillover? If the 2008 crisis is a global crisis, a view such as that of Wallerstein (2001)—‘the world economy won’t recover, now or ever’—follows. Capitalism-apocalypse has been a dominant leftist mood since Marx in 1848. Capitalism in the singular, reified as global capitalism, shuts off the possibility of alternative capitalisms. In emerging economies and developing countries the talk is of state capitalism (Bremmer, 2009), entrepreneurial state capitalism, developmental state capitalism, and contender state-societies (van der Pijl, 2012), but if the premise is convergence thinking, does this matter? Much work on capitalism explores these varieties and byways, but more conventional work takes shortcuts. The problem is not simply methodological nationalism, but also methodological globalization—the leap to the global, as in global culture, global modernity, and global capitalism.

If, as Khondker says, ‘global, in the end, is a perspective, a frame through which we look at the world’ (2013, this issue), critical awareness of the frames and lenses we use is essential. If global 3.0 is about introducing complexity as part of global studies, these insightful and valuable comments suggest that this is a welcome part of the methodology of globalization research.

References


